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This article is based on two months of fieldwork conducted in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2010. It is a 
feminist reflection on the politics of aid, gender, and religion within the context of civil society 
organizations’ efforts to address violence against women in Afghanistan. As gender and ending 
violence against women are “sensitive” topics in the country, donors increasingly adopt an Islamic 
framework when engaging with men and local communities. While Afghan women’s 
organizations have always engaged with a broad spectrum of stakeholders, amongst whom are the 
religious clerics and scholars, I argue that a donor-driven approach that treats Islam as the only 
entry-point not only simplifies the complexities of Islam, but it also creates a distinction between 
“religious” vs. “secular” dichotomy which makes the work of local women’s organisations and 
activists even more challenging as their engagement strategies are narrowed. 
 




Este articulo se basa en dos meses de trabajo de campo llevado a cabo en Kabul, Afganistán en 
2010.  Se trata de una reflección feminista sobre la política de ayuda, del género y de la religión en 
el contexto de los esfuerzos de las organizaciones de sociedad civil para hacer frente a la violencia 
contra las mujeres en Afganistán.  En cuanto al género y la eliminación de violencia contra las 
mujeres son temes “sensibles” en el país, los donantes adoptan cada vez más un marco Islamista al 
tratar con los hombres y las comunidades locales.  Mientras las organizaciones de mujeres afganas 
siempre han comprometido con un amplio espectro de partes interesadas, entre los cuales están 
clérigos religiosos y académicos, yo sostengo que un enfoque impulsado por los donantes que trata 
el Islam como el único punto de entrada no sólo simplifica las complejidades del Islam, pero 
también crea una distinción entre el “religioso” frente “secular” dicotomía que hace que el trabajo 
de las organizaciones locales de mujeres y activistas aun más difícil como sus estrategias de 
participación se estrechan. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVES: Afganistán; el enfoque religioso; los hombres y desarrollo; los derechos 
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We face the challenge of how to frame the discourse of gender and women’s human 
rights within the Afghan context…without undermining our relationship with women’s 
organisations or the local communities (A27 Interview 2010). 
In Afghanistan, civil society organisations, whether they be the Afghan government, 
international donor agencies, or local community-based organisations, are very much caught 
up in the ‘critical conjuncture…of religion, politics and women’s equality’ (Tadros 2011, 1). 
Over the past few years, there has been a strong rallying of identity politics through political 
Islam,1 and the international donor community, in part influenced by local stakeholders, have 
increasingly come to rely on religion as a shortcut to achieving development goals and social 
justice. The impact of this policy decision can be seen in the way that some gender projects 
have been ‘religion-sensitised,’ which has brought both short-term gains and long-term 
issues. The favoured approach to engage men and the conservative sector of Afghan societies 
is to reconstruct Afghan masculinity through Islam. Afghanistan has been a focus of 
international donors since the events of 11 September 2001, with the total aid reported to the 
Development Co-Operation Directorate (DCD DAC) from all donors amounting to US$29 
billion between 2001 and 2010 (Poole 2010). The combination of aid delivery and military 
occupation – where historically the latter has been bitterly resisted – has produced a complex 
power relationship between donors, partners, and aid recipients. Since many of the donors 
and implementing agencies are the same nationalities of the Coalition force, local 
communities perceive them as carrying both aid and security agendas. On the other hand, 
many local staff in civil society organisations (especially those based in Kabul) come from 
middle-class families in urban settings, or are expatriates who have returned from overseas 
(such as Iran or Pakistan). Thus, there is also tension amongst the Afghans between the locals 
and the ‘newcomers’ who have better qualifications and more experience (A1 Interview 
2011; A6 Interview 2010). In order to navigate through this difficult terrain of power 
differentials and identity politics, Islam is often seen as a rallying point to unite beyond 
disagreements, especially when it comes to sensitive topics such as women’s rights and 
gender equality (A29 Interview 2010; A6 Interview 2010). 
 
The intersection of gender, politics and religion has been of strong interest to feminists, 
particularly regarding how women fare from the experience—whether that may be attempts 
to gender sensitise religious frameworks, or to challenge the limitations of reforms (Helie-
Lucas 1993; Mir-Hosseini and Hamzic 2010; Moghissi 2008). The aim of this article is to 
provide a case study from Afghanistan on how gender, aid, and Islam interact within a 
context of occupation, war, and conflict. The military occupation has provided the 
opportunities for a greater number of aid agencies to operate in Afghanistan. At the same 
time, implementing gender projects has become increasingly sensitive, as communities 
suspect that aid agencies working on gender issues are part of a western attempt to undermine 
local cultures and practices. This article is based on materials from fieldwork conducted in 
Kabul in 2010, during which time 40 participants were interviewed using qualitative research 
methodologies of individual interviews and focus group sessions. The participants ranged 
from local and international NGOs, staff from Afghan ministries, local activists, international 
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1 In using the term ‘political Islam’ I want to make a distinction between religion as faith and religion as politics. 
Whilst this may be an artificial construct that overlooks the blurring between faith and politics, I do want to 
stress that this article is a critique of how religion is instrumentalized for political gains, which also extends to 





consultants, and bilateral and multilateral agencies, with the key source of information 
coming from local and international NGOs. Due to security concerns, research in rural areas 
was not able to be conducted. Names of the research participants have been coded with some 
identifying details changed to protect their privacy. 
 
Religion, Human Rights, and the Aid Angle 
While feminists such as Sally Engle Merry (2006) have argued for the adaptation of human 
rights into local terms and contexts, including the use of social practices and traditions such 
as religion, others such as Deniz Kandiyoti and  Hania Sholkamy have pointed out the risks 
of using religion to promote rights and equality in theocratic states, which can make religion 
‘the arbitrator of politics and social change’ (Sholkamy 2011, 48). Analysis from fieldwork 
findings suggests that there is consensus amongst  informants that Islam and women’s rights 
are not inimical to one another, and that there is an opportunity for both academics and civil 
society organisations to review advocacy strategies around gender and women’s rights so that 
messages can reach a broader spectrum of aid recipients. However, there is an inadvertent 
reinforcement of ‘benevolent patriarchy’ when advocating for male behavioural changes. For 
instance, a majority of civil society organisations, including international NGOs and 
community-based organisations, found community resistance to discussions of domestic 
violence. A popular strategy used by NGOs to counter this issue is to utilize social norm 
marketing2 to deliver messages about men’s roles in the family within a construct of Islamic 
masculinity. While it is not within the scope of this paper to provide a theological and 
feminist consideration on Islam, gender, and social justice, I wish to highlight an emerging 
trend that Hania Sholkamy (2010) and other feminists have identified as the 
‘instrumentalization of Islam’.3 This involves the simplistic re-packaging of religion by 
international aid agencies and academics, who ‘think they have found the key to hearts and 
minds in the region, and that this key is ensconced in a religious box’ (Sholkamy 2010). This 
approach has also been adopted by some aid agencies in Afghanistan toward the issue of 
gender equality and violence against women and, in the case of engaging with men, the 
preference is to reform male identities and practices through the authority of the Qur’an. 
While support of the religious sector in a country with a 99 percent Muslim majority may be 
seen as strategic and practical, I will argue that the arbitrary distinction between a secular 
framework of gender and development (interpreted as atheist, western, white feminist and 
hostile to indigeneity) versus a religious one (perceived as culturally sensitive and universally 
endorsed) is not only false (Kandiyoti 2011), as the feminist space prioritises plurality of 
discourse, but also promotes the ‘notion that choices have to be religiously recommended and 
sanctioned’ (Sholkamy 2011, 50). 
Furthermore, the ‘instrumentalization of Islam’ as a quick-fix solution to reduce gender 
discrimination and violence not only weakens the legitimacy of activists who seek a 
pluralistic space, but it also assumes that Islam is a homogenous religion with no tensions 
between the different schools and branches. Within US military campaigns, as well as U.S. 
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2 The term ‘social norms marketing’ refers to ‘traditional marketing techniques, including mass media and face 
to face campaigns that are designed to alter individuals’ perceptions about which attitudes and behaviors are 
typical or desirable in their community’ (Paluck et al 2010, 1). 
3 There is a significant body of feminist analyses on religion, gender, and women’s rights. One of the most 
recent and lively discussions can be found in the IDS Bulletin’s issue titled Religion, Rights and Gender at the 





government-funded research institutes such as Brookings,4 there is a tendency to politicise 
Islam as part of the ‘winning hearts and minds’ strategy (Blaydes 2009; Crockatt 2005). Civil 
society organisations that wish to distance themselves from the military campaign should 
avoid aligning their advocacy materials with such rhetoric in order to prevent 
misunderstandings from local communities. Additionally, the use of Islam is not purely a 
donor-driven agenda, as interviews from local Afghans who work in the NGO sector indicate 
that the push to instrumentalize Islam comes from both external and local pressures (A30 
Interview 2010; A25b Interview, 2010).  
This article will reflect on ‘the politics of gender, namely processes of appropriation, 
contestation and reinterpretation of positions on gender relations and women’s rights by state, 
non-state and global actors’ (Kandiyoti 2011, 13), and how it is played out in the context of 
‘reconstructing’ Afghan men through Islam. In conclusion, I propose that whilst a religious 
framework is important in opening dialogue and acceptance about gender equality in Afghan 
communities, donor civil society organisations should also build the capacity of their staff 
and project implementing partners, co-ordinate better among implementing partners on 
existing projects, and focus on male behavioural change through a better understanding of 
masculinities and gender relations in local contexts. 
 
Women’s Rights in Afghanistan 
The liberation of women was one of the many rationales used to justify the US-led military 
invasion of Afghanistan. Before and during the military campaign, western media was 
saturated with images of Afghan women in blue burqas (including a revival of interest on 
Sharbat Gula, the ‘Afghan Girl’ who appeared on the front cover of the National Geographic 
in 1985), and video footage of women being flogged or stoned by the Taliban. Political 
leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair (supported by their wives) co-opted feminist 
rhetoric, endorsed by celebrity figures and certain advocacy groups.5 However, despite this 
front of female liberation, the status and situation of Afghan women and girls remain 
relatively unchanged and, in some instances, have worsened. According to Womankind 
Worldwide (2008), a UK NGO, 80 percent of Afghan women are affected by domestic 
violence, over 60 percent of marriages are forced, and half of all girls are married before the 
age of 16. The high prevalence of violence against women is echoed in the UNIFEM 2008 
Violence Against Women Primary Database Report, which states, ‘women and girls are 
mostly abused by people close to them; i.e. family members, partners, step family members, 
in-laws and other relatives’ (UNIFEM 2008, 35). According to the UNIFEM report, this 
group amounts to 92 percent of the reported cases of abuse’, and frequently ‘when the women 
or girls seek recourse from the government they are further molested by the government 
representatives’ (UNIFEM 2008, 35). 
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4 The Brookings Institute is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington DC. Its largest funding 
contributors include the US Government, Ford Foundation, ExxonMobil, and the Bank of America. 
5 This is not to say that there were no campaigns led by women’s NGOs prior to September 2001 that 
highlighted the Taliban’s oppression of women, or of the mujahid, or of the Soviet Union’s human rights 
violations. Indeed, within Afghanistan there has been a lively history of women’s activism, such as the All 
Afghan Women’s Union (AAWU), which has been operating since the Taliban regime and provides education 






The illiteracy rate is high in the Afghan police force, which makes accurate and detailed 
reporting and documentation difficult.6  Even if a domestic violence report is successfully 
lodged with the police, there is the question of where the victim can go if her family home is 
unsafe. There are a few women’s shelters in larger cities such as Kabul and Herat, but they 
are almost unheard of in rural areas (A3 Interview 2010; A4 Interview 2010; Nojumi et al 
2009, 95-96). The few that do exist are not immune to political interference. Afghanistan has 
approximately 11 independent shelters funded by international donors and managed by local 
women’s NGOs. In February 2011, the Afghan government proposed that the shelters be 
administrated by the government and include a review panel to assess women’s ‘eligibility.’ 
Due to the international community’s response, the Afghan government backed down from 
the original proposal, instead calling for greater regulation and monitoring of the quality of 
the shelters (AFP 2011). It was speculated in an email press release by the Afghan Women’s 
Network (email 17 February 2011) that the original plan to take over the women’s shelters 
was, in part, due to the government bowing to pressures from tribes and clans who were 
unhappy that the government was giving refuge to abused women with foreign assistance. 
According to Kandiyoti (2007), the Afghan history of various attempts at modernization in 
the twentieth century, including reforms to promote the status and greater participation of 
women, have generally originated from urban-based, westernised elites. These efforts to 
consolidate power from a peripheral location in a country with diverse ethnic groups often 
result in conflicts between ‘modernisers and traditionalists and between women’s 
emancipation and patriarchy’ (Moghadam 1993, 248). Due to the politicisation of the status 
of women in Afghanistan, the state is often paralysed in its policy towards women and 
gender, else it deliberately denies women’s rights for the sake of political convenience. 
Examples of the latter include the attempted regulation of women’s shelters in 2011, and 
President Harmid Karzai’s signing of the Shia Personal Status Law in 2009, which imposed 
greater restrictions upon women’s legal rights around marital abuse, child marriage, and 
polygamy (Oates 2009). While the Law is now undergoing a reform process to make it more 
equitable for women, there is no guarantee on whether the reforms will be actively adopted 
and enforced, as NGO working groups have reported strong resistance from parliamentarians 
(A5a Interview 2010). Afghan women now face a precarious situation where neither the 
government nor informal support networks (such as family) are supportive of their rights—a 
situation not dissimilar to the Taliban regime prior to the US-led military campaign. 
 
Elimination of Violence against Women: Too sensitive and too western 
In Afghanistan, everything that is about women is too sensitive (A27 Interview 
2010). 
Despite the international media coverage of gender-based violence in Afghanistan, at the 
daily level both local and international civil society organisations have found it difficult to 
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6 Gender-sensitive victim response from the police is also lacking, according to Halima, a 35 year old woman 
who escaped after her husband sold her to three men to cover gambling debt: ‘If we women had any confidence 
in the ability of the government to protect us I would have not come to this women’s shelter but would have 
gone to them in the first place. Instead, I was made to sit in a police station for half an hour and was accused of 
every possible crime by the police after I escaped home’ (from the press release of the Afghan Women’s 





talk about the issue due to a number of factors. At the community level, one of the key 
challenges for civil society organisations is the denial from the community that sexual and 
gender-based violence exists and/or that it is a western agenda. As one gender program 
officer from a national NGO explained, 
[i]t’s not easy to talk about violence [against women] because people say there is no wife 
beating in Afghanistan. If you go to the community and talk about it then they get angry 
because [they say] it doesn’t exist or you have a western agenda (A23 Interview 2010). 
I witnessed this type of response during a one-day workshop in Kabul organised by an 
Afghan women’s NGO. The purpose of the workshop was to inform community members, 
shuras (community leaders), mullahs, and the civil society sector on the progress of the 
Family Law Reform. The initiative was led by various NGOs and the more liberal7 religious 
scholars to provide more protection for women and children, especially on issues around 
inheritance, early marriage, domestic violence, and polygamy.8 The workshop included a 
female human rights lawyer who gave a presentation. After her speech, a heated debate 
ensued as the audience (the majority of whom were men) argued about the loss of Afghan 
culture and stated that the Family Law Reform process is a western feminist agenda aimed at 
breaking up Afghan families. At the conference conclusion, I asked an Afghan woman who 
sat next to me whether such debates were common. She replied: ‘This happens every time 
when we try to talk about women’s issues. It is their way to stop the discussion’ (A21 
Interview 2010).9  
One explanation for the strong opposition from the males in the audience is the way that 
custom and tradition have defined gender roles and values. In their nationwide research on 
livelihood and security for rural Afghans, Nojumi et al (2009, 93) concludes that: ‘[f]emale 
chastity and female behaviour are some of the primary sources of family’s honour or 
potential disgrace.’  At the centre of the honor code lies the socially defined notion of 
masculinity, where Afghan men ‘see women as the repository of their honor’ (Rubin 2002, 
24). The definition of a ‘breach’ by women of this assigned role has expanded over time from 
adultery to attempts to exercise self-autonomy, such as the right to choose marriage partners 
or divorce an abusive husband. Coming from this perspective, attempts to reform the Family 
Law so that women have greater protection and rights in areas such as inheritance, marriage 
and divorce, as well as domestic violence, may be seen as a threat to undermine a masculine 
hegemony that functions through the control of women. 
Moreover, staff within civil society organisations internalise the attitude that violence against 
women is too ‘sensitive’ to work on in Afghan communities. This can be illustrated by the 
experience of an international NGO that has operated in Afghanistan for a number of years in 
humanitarian and agricultural support. Although the organisation has no direct programs or 
projects that address gender-based violence, it operates a series of women’s empowerment 
projects that focus on income-generation activities, capacity-building and empowerment. In 
early 2010, female beneficiaries requested NGO staff to address domestic violence and 
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7 ‘Liberal’ is the term used by Afghan NGO workers and religious scholars when describing an understanding of 
Islam and gender issues that seek to promote equality and protection of women’s human rights. 
8 See Rights and Democracy Afghanistan, which has an English version of the proposed changes: 
http://www.dd-rd.af/?page_id=412. 
9 This experience is shared by other women’s NGOs in Afghanistan. See Counterpart International’s report, 






engage with local men to support anti-domestic violence initiatives. However, the 
organisation became caught in an internal debate on how to follow up the community’s 
request, as staff were divided over a course of action. Some staff expressed reluctance, 
arguing that any projects that focus on gender-based violence would potentially have a 
negative impact on other program areas. Another cause for reluctance was due to previous 
experiences where small gender-sensitive initiatives such as hygiene kits (which contain 
soap, a sewing kit, and other basic cleaning items) were rejected by the community, who saw 
them as too ‘western.’ Therefore, despite the local women’s requests for help to stop 
domestic violence in the community, the organisation was divided over what should be done. 
As the interview participant (A27 Interview 2010) from the organisation explained, ‘the 
rationale from the staff was, if such a minor issue already presented an obstacle, what would 
happen if something about [domestic] violence is done?’  
It would be easy to criticize the NGO for not meeting a request for help from women in the 
community with which they work. However, both international and local NGOs, particularly 
female local staff, face enormous security challenges in occupied Afghanistan. In a 2009 
report, the UN Assistance Missions to Afghanistan documented the increasing attacks against 
women in the public sphere, noting that female activists who work on human rights or 
women’s rights are often labelled as being ‘involved in an anti-Islamic conspiracy’ and are 
attacked, sometimes by their own community (UNAMA 2009, 12). Another example is from 
a women’s NGO that provides support to women experiencing domestic violence. The NGO 
explained that as part of client support, the organisation used to conduct follow-up visits to 
the woman’s house; however, a female staff member was recently physically attacked by 
local criminals as ‘punishment’ for her work. Subsequently, the NGO ceased its follow-up 
visits to clients (A4b Interview 2010). Security risks are of particular concern for local NGOs 
that do not have the same resources or budgets for security measures as international NGOs. 
At the same time, Afghan employees in international NGOs agencies face greater risks than 
their expatriate counterparts, as many Afghans work in rural areas or for outreach (that is, 
face-to-face meetings with individuals and groups to assess needs and issues). In fact, female 
activists regularly change mobile phone numbers to avoid being tracked, or they would 
‘disappear’ for days or weeks, taking refuge in either their own home or that of a relative or 
friend, until it was safe to re-appear in public (A3a Interview 2010). With the impending 
withdrawal of the U.S. and other foreign military presences over the next few years, as well 
as the attempt to establish amnesty for and reintegration of the anti-government forces, there 
is grave concern that the rights and safety of Afghan women will continue to deteriorate 
(Human Rights Watch 2010). 
The examples given above provide a snapshot of the challenges (both external factors and 
internalised attitudes and norms) of working on gender-based violence in Afghanistan. This is 
not to say these experiences are shared by every civil society organisation, but rather, when 
asked about the challenges of working with local communities on violence against women in 
terms of intervention and prevention, informants from civil society organisations invariably 
cite issues of cultural sensitivity, fear of westernisation, and security as the key barriers to 








‘They Come through the Door and Leave by the Window’: Power politics of the aid 
partnership 
While there are many good practice examples of gender projects and partnerships, the 
relationship between donor and partner NGOs is a fraught one due to the power differentials 
between the developed and developing countries’ agencies. In the Afghanistan context, this is 
further intensified by the large number of foreign donors who have competing interests and 
priorities that may not be aligned with local needs. As one manager (A25b Interview 2010) 
from a women’s organization explained, ‘[s]ometimes we take on projects which are not our 
focus…because I have to pay the staff, and because the projects are decided by [the 
donors].’10  Other challenges include a lack of consultation with local partner organizations, 
poor coordination amongst international agencies, and the absence of a unified strategy on 
achieving gender equality (A3 Interview 2010; Kandiyoti 2009). 
When the Taliban regime was overthrown, there was great hope amongst Afghan women, as 
one professional Afghan woman recounted: 
In the early 2000… yes, there was great optimism. Remember, we had to give up 
our jobs and education… when the Taliban was here. So when [the international 
community] came… we thought women would quickly gain our rights and freedom. 
But there was no coordination between donors and international, and the optimism 
gave way (A21 Interview 2010). 
A local women’s NGO (A6a Interview 2010) related that after being supported for more than 
five years in operating a community centre, the donor informed them in 2009 that funding 
would cease as the donor agency’s priorities had shifted. There was no phasing strategy to 
ease the NGO’s financial burden in the process of searching for another donor, so the NGO 
now runs the community centre from its core funding. For another women’s NGO, the 
challenge was to find long-term funding for a male-behavioural change project that had been 
funded on a ‘pilot’ basis for the previous three years, despite the project having received 
much praise from the donors (A7 Interview, 2010). But the main issue for local organisations 
who are ‘partners’ with donor agencies is the short timeframe given for project activities, 
making it difficult for local organisations to implement activities that involve awareness-
raising and behavioural change. These both require a significant investment of time with local 
communities so that trust and rapport can be established. As one NGO explained: 
They [international donors] want us to do gender training in three days. Do they 
think it’s a game, that we just get some men and women together and give them 
tea? To change people, you need time. Donors don’t treat us seriously (A5b 
Interview 2010). 
The informant’s frustration is supported by feminists critical of the gender and development 
field, where they see more radical concepts and processes co-opted by the mainstream so that 
ideas such as ‘empowerment’ are reduced from ‘a complex process of self-realization, self-
actualization and mobilization to demand change’ to a simple act of knowledge or resource 
transfer (Cornwall et al. 2007, 7). 
It may be easy to attribute the entire blame to donor agencies; however, they also face 
pressure from governments back home to implement or prioritize a certain agenda that does 
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not take account of the local context or circumstances. This can best be illustrated from a 
conversation with a gender advisor from a bilateral agency: 
This is a common story… donors going ahead with their gender projects. Look, we 
have certainly learned from our mistakes—I remember one case [a donor 
government] wanted to do some workshop on women’s empowerment in the [name 
of province]—that was when there’s a severe food shortage in the area!  But 
sometimes there are political pressures from your own government (A10b Interview 
2010). 
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, these experiences with donors have made many Afghan 
NGOs wary of the international community, which was succinctly summed up by one activist 
(A7 Interview 2010): ‘In Kabul we have a phrase for the international community: ‘they 
come through the door and leave by the window’.  Within this context of tension and distrust 
between local NGOs and the international community, I will explore how both donors and 
civil society organisations attempt to overcome these barriers in an environment of global 
contestation over ‘how to do gender’ in occupied Afghanistan. 
 
Contestations of ‘How to do Gender’ in Afghanistan 
The instrumentalization of Islam, and its impact on aid projects in Afghanistan, must be seen 
within the context of widespread dissatisfaction with the Coalition forces’ military campaigns 
after September 2001. For instance, surveys conducted by polling firms and NGOs indicate 
that respondents, especially in Muslim majority states, have an overwhelmingly negative 
view of the United States (Blaydes 2009, 2). However, rather than viewing this discontent as 
a global phenomenon where citizens in western countries such as Australia, New Zealand, 
and others have also expressed strong sentiments against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the U.S. media and some academics attribute this as proof of Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilisations’ theory. Huntington theorised in the 1990s that post-Cold War conflicts would 
arise from cultural rifts and tensions (Blaydes 2009; Crockatt 2005, 121-122; Huntington 
1993). At the same time, the counter-insurgency of ‘winning hearts and minds’ was a 
favoured approach in the Middle East.11 In Afghanistan, the most well-known example of this 
approach is the military-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which was introduced by 
the U.S. government and has been operating since 2002. 
The relationship between NGOs and the Coalition forces in Afghanistan has always been 
fraught, as the international NGOs regard association with the Coalition as a risk to NGO 
staff safety. For instance, in a joint briefing paper written by eleven international NGOs, 
including Action Aid, Oxfam, and Marie Stopes International, it was argued that 
‘[h]umanitarian agencies rely on local acceptance to ensure their security, for which their 
perceived identity as independent and impartial is critical’ (Waldman 2009, 17). Furthermore, 
the paper criticised the PRT for its diversion of bilateral funding from the Afghan civilian 
development process, and the creation of geographical disparities in aid distribution due to 
the PRT’s selection of project areas (based on counter-insurgency rather than a unified, 
country-wide development approach). It concludes: 
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11 The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ was first used during the Malayan Emergency, when British 
troops would give local Malayans and indigenous tribes food and aid. It was also used during the Vietnam War 





PRTs’ hearts and minds approach to assistance, drawn from counter-insurgency doctrine, is not only at 
odds with accepted principles of development, but, given that it is so often ineffective and unsustainable, 
it is highly unlikely to achieve its intended security objectives (Waldman 2009, 5). 
 
However, international NGOs seek to maintain ‘a clear distinction between the role and 
function of humanitarian actors from that of the military’ (Wagner 2005), including the 
establishment of a non-binding ‘Guidelines for the Interaction of Civilian and Military Actors 
in Afghanistan’ in 2008. Although the international aid agencies maintain a strong policy 
position to distinguish and distance themselves from military-led aid programs, the 
distinction is harder to define when both aid agencies and the military forces attempt to 
localise their projects within what they perceive as an entry point to Afghanistan’s cultural 
and social framework. Examples of these include the use of Muslim troops from the UAE to 
deliver aid in rural communities (BBC 2008), incorporation of NGO women’s programs such 
as the Asia Foundation’s ‘Women’s Rights within an Islamic Framework’, and other case 
studies to be discussed below. This is not to suggest that there is a direct policy consensus to 
instrumentalize Islam between the Coalition military and the international NGOs, but is 
intended as a reflection on the contradictions when international aid communities distance 
themselves from military operations, yet at the same time adopt similar strategies for program 
advocacy and implementation. 
 
Kandiyoti (2009) has observed that Afghanistan has been the ‘target of a sustained, if ill-
coordinated, campaign to institutionalize mechanisms and benchmarks for gender equality’. 
Similarly, a comparison can be made with the way that the international community has 
sought to use religion as an entry point to work with local communities on domestic violence 
and gender issues. In an Islamic republic where the population is 99 percent Muslim (of 
which approximately 80 percent are Sunni and 19 percent Shi’a), it makes sense that any 
gender programs would take religion into consideration, whether it be identifying the various 
religious actors and groups during stakeholder mapping or engaging with religious scholars 
and leaders in dialogues to promote equality and protection of women’s rights. A good 
practice example of this is a project implemented by the Educational Training Center for Poor 
Women and Girls of Afghanistan (ECW), designed to build the capacity of local shura 
(community) leaders in conflict resolution. To ensure that the project had local acceptance 
and ownership, ECW consulted with local shuras on which areas of expertise they wished to 
be trained in. The shuras identified conflict resolution, particularly in relation to domestic 
violence, as an area where they lacked language and skills (A25 Interview 2010). During the 
training manual design process, ECW engaged with both the shuras and religious scholars on 
how to incorporate Islam and gender considerations into the document. The project was 
widely cited by various Afghan and international NGOs as an example of good practice in 
how a project aimed at reducing violence against women is both culturally and gender-
sensitive. This confirms Merry’s (2006, 10) argument that cultures are ‘far more fluid and 
open to change than the essentialized model suggests’ if genuine engagement with local 
communities is practiced. 
Another example of good practice where the process involved a wide range of stakeholders 
was the USAID-funded ‘Rule of Law’ project.12 One of the project’s aims was to facilitate 
dialogue between conservative and progressive Islamic scholars, and identify rules and 
principles used in the informal justice sector that were inconsistent with a gender-sensitive 
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interpretation of the Qur’an (A2 Interview 2010).13 As part of this process, the project 
established a 45-people consultation group consisting of academics, judges, Sharia Law 
experts, Afghan women activists and mullahs. This was followed by meetings between both 
progressive and conservative Islamic scholars. The purposes of these meetings were to focus 
on building the relationship between conservative scholars and other interest groups that had 
a different interpretation of the Qur’an, and to apply a feminist approach (A2 Interview 
2010). One of the promising indicators of success was that while previously conservative 
mullahs would leave the room when a female Islamic scholar presented a talk, after several 
meetings they accepted women’s ability and right to discuss religious matters (A2 Interview 
2010). 
However, there are concerns that development agencies regard Islam as an easy choice. For 
instance, Palwasha Hassan (A29 interview 2010), former Country Director of Rights and 
Democracy Afghanistan, pointed out that whilst engaging with the local communities through 
Islam and building a dialogue between progressive and conservative Islamic scholars are 
important, these strategies must take into consideration the causes and complexities of 
women’s issues in Afghanistan. For instance, the national average literacy rate stands at 28.1 
per cent, with women at 12.6 per cent compared to men at 43.1 per cent (CIA 2011). This 
means people’s understanding of the Qur’an and other religious texts such as the Hadith14 is 
limited, and learning is mainly through rote memorization. Further, there is no regulation of 
the training and assessment of mullahs in Afghanistan. In an interview with the Academy of 
Scientific Research (a government institution that produces advocacy and information 
materials on Islam), informants identified the need for greater regulation in the training, 
assessment, and qualifications of mullahs, none of which is being carried out by the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs and the Hajj (which the Academy is not part of) due to its limited 
capacity (Focus Group Meeting 2010).15 On the other hand, some institutes have argued for 
the potential of recruiting mullahs, due to their influence in the local community, as part of 
the counter-insurgency campaign. An example is the commentary on Huffington Post from 
Christine Coleman, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institute, and Musada Sultan, an adviser 
to the Afghan government: 
There are approximately 150,000 mosques across Afghanistan, but less than three 
percent of them are even registered with the government, primarily because of a lack 
of funding and reach… Putting mullahs on the government's payroll will not change 
loyalties overnight. But as part of a counterinsurgency ‘clear, hold and build’ 
strategy, paying mullahs a steady salary of up to $200 per month (roughly what the 
Taliban pays its fighters) in villages that have been ‘cleared’ can be a cost-effective 
way to help ‘hold’…[and] could ultimately reduce the need for very expensive 
military operations, saving lives as well as money (Coleman and Sultan 2009). 
However, given the complexities of the Afghan conflict, as well as the diversity of Islam, 
‘putting mullahs on the government’s payroll’ (Coleman and Sultan 2009) may be a 
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13 ‘Correct’ in this sense means the interpretations are also consistent with current Afghan legislation. 
14 The Hadith is the words and actions of the prophet Muhammad. Just as there are two key denominations of 
Islam, Shi’ism and Sunnism, there are also different sets and interpretations of the Hadith. 
15 While the Academy of Scientific Research identifies itself as ‘liberal’ (because it is comprised of religious 
scholars who promote a contemporary interpretation of the Qur’an, including the support for women’s legal 
rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance), the Academy director did not extend this allowance towards 
sexuality, and condemned marriages between ‘two men or two women’ to be ‘the product of human rights 





somewhat simplistic solution to achieving gender equality or fighting the Taliban. While 
there is scope for the Afghan government to provide training and regulation of mullahs, to 
compete with the Taliban by paying clerics in return for their support is not only a shallow 
interpretation of Islam, it can also put them at risk of local jihadist groups. Additionally, what 
religious leaders can or cannot do within their community is limited by local contexts. While 
it is undeniable that Islam has a significant role in defining the cultural, political, and legal 
landscape of the country, tribal factions, customary systems of justice, a change of hierarchy 
in villages from a feudal landlord system to a division between the rich (jihadist groups and 
powerful warlords) and the poor, also shape contemporary gender norms and practices, 
especially in rural areas (Nojumi et al 2009, 259). As one NGO staff member wryly observed, 
‘The people follow the mullah, and the mullah follows the people’ (A4a Interview 2010). In 
other words, how religion is interpreted, implemented and practised is contingent upon 
cultural and political paradigms (Anwar 2006; Moghissi 1996). Though possessing religious 
authority, mullahs are also under pressure from their constituents, especially those with 
economic and political influence. Therefore, when involving the religious sector in anti-
violence against women initiatives, their limitations, as well as competing local interests, 
should be taken into consideration. 
From a feminist perspective, focusing purely on an Islamic framework also detracts from 
institutional problems and state-perpetrated discrimination against women. As Ayub et al. 
(2009, 12) maintains: 
[l]ess comfortable for observers to acknowledge, perhaps, is that the Taliban’s vision for 
social order was not entirely alien to large segments of Afghan society. Many of the 
government’s laws, particularly with respect to women, were an extension of the complex 
tribal codes and social customs already in effect in the Pashtun south. 
It should be noted that Ayub’s argument is not meant to represent culture as an obstacle to 
human and women’s rights in Afghanistan, but is an indirect critique of President Hamid 
Karzai, who is an ethnic Pashtun from southern Afghanistan. Karzai’s policies on women—
from the Shiite Personal Status Law in 2009 that restricts women’s marital rights to the recent 
proposal to regulate women’s shelters—often do not respect the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), to which Afghanistan is a 
signatory party. 
!
 The ‘Happy Family and Healthy Community’ Project 
The ‘Happy Family and Healthy Community’ project is a joint initiative between UNFPA 
(United Nations Population Fund), GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit), the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and the Hajj. It has been operating in 16 districts near Kabul since 2007 and is now in 
its second phase. The project is implemented by government agencies, with UNFPA and 
other partners (including the Supreme Court and donors) providing funding and technical 
support. Its purpose is to raise community awareness of and support for women’s rights and 
access to health care through the training of mullahs, Shura scholars and other religious 
leaders as community educators. While the project does not directly address violence against 
women, the religious leaders talk about ‘healthy family relationships…including domestic 
violence…from an Islamic perspective’ (A27 Interview 2010). In addition, the project aims to 
use the trained religious leaders to reach out to Afghan men, with the assumption that men 





Religious Affairs official who also took part in the project, explains: ‘When Afghan people 
are given instruction based on their religious values, they will listen and accept’ (Ryan 2008). 
Furthermore, the definition of a ‘healthy marriage’ is defined by a Supreme Court official as 
follows: ‘Having a healthy mother and a healthy family is what it means to have a healthy 
marriage in Islam’ (Ryan 2008). The religious leaders’ views are further reinforced through a 
series of media and knowledge products such as radio spots, public events, posters, and 
pamphlets.!
The rhetoric and approach used by the project’s promotional booklet closely follows the 
social norm marketing strategy used by many organisations to advocate the elimination of 
violence against women around the world. In essence, social norm marketing 
conveys messages aimed at convincing its audience that certain attitudes and behaviours 
will be received as ‘normal’ (typical or desirable) by relevant community members. 
Messages carrying information about social norms (e.g., ‘men in this community believe 
in treating women with respect!’) can thus be distinguished from marketing aimed at 
improving individual attitudes (e.g., ‘women are worthy of respect!’) or at changing 
individual beliefs (e.g., ‘beating a woman does not prove your authority over her!’) 
(Paluck et al 2010, 2). 
In the context of the ‘Happy Family, Healthy Society’ project, the social norm is the 
presumed Islamic norms and values that communities uphold, and the booklet has many 
citations (interpreted from a gender-sensitive perspective) from the Qur’an and the Hadith to 
lend religious authority. For instance, on men’s responsibilities towards their children, the 
booklet explains: ‘The Prophet (PBUH) says “the one who tries for the comfort of his family 
is equal to a Mujahid who is doing Jihad.” Mizan Alhekma, Page 20’ (UNFPA et al. date 
unknown, 5). Jihad in this context is defined as ‘the father who works for the comfort of his 
family, and will be blessed as a Mujahid who fights for the sake of God’ (UNFPA et al date 
unknown, 5). From an instrumentalist approach, the booklet also sends out a clear message 
about men’s roles in supporting the family and their spouse: 
Men are also advised to consult with family members regarding family and social matters 
[...]. Men should use their gentlest and most polite way of speaking in the family. The 
man should try to make his wife happy, as she is also his best friend. He should not hurt 
her dignity or honour and must respect her as a person. (UNFPA et al., date unknown 6) 
As project evaluation reports were unavailable, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
project. However, I would argue that projects such as the ‘Happy Family, Healthy 
Community’ have good intentions, but in their efforts to instruct the local communities on the 
‘role of men in the family in the broader context of Islam and the Hadith’ (UNFPA et al. date 
unknown, i), opportunities to engage with men in exploring the complexities of gender norms 
and values are missed. In their attempt to reform and reconstruct men along a pious  manhood 
based on what is seen as a liberal interpretation of Islam, the project inadvertently 
essentializes people’s understanding and interactions with religious beliefs. 
If activists and NGOs wish to take ‘advantage of the potential of local cultural practices for 
change’ (Merry 2006, 11), a good example is Bedari, a Pakistan women’s NGO that works 
with rural districts near Islamabad and runs workshops in the local communities on 
discrimination against female children. One of the awareness-raising exercises Bedari uses is 
to divide the workshop participants into two groups: in one group, participants write down 
what people say to a family who just had a baby girl, while the other group writes responses 
given when a child with a disability was born. The workshop facilitator then asks each group 





individuals with disabilities are similar (P2 Interview 2010). Another example is the All 
Afghan Women’s Union, which works with rural districts in the outskirts of Kabul to 
increase women’s income generation opportunities by encouraging husbands and wives to 
work together in a cash crop project. This project is endorsed by the local shura and religious 
leaders, who donated a small plot of land for the purpose (A1b Interview 2010). These 
examples demonstrate the ways in which Afghan men can be engaged in projects aimed at 
social change. Therefore, rather than only giving men instructions on how to be good Muslim 
husbands and fathers, the joint UNFPA project could also ask men to reflect on the following: 
what they know of the tasks done by their wife during the day; the difficulties of childbirth 
without access to medical support; awareness of deaths in childbirths in their own village; or 
even a self-examination of what it means to be a man in terms of their roles and expectations 
in life. Similarly, the booklet advises men that their wife is their ‘best friend,’ but more could 
have been said on how to achieve this level of trust and intimacy. Whilst I do not advocate 
for or assume that a revolution in gender relations comes packaged in a book, it is 
nevertheless crucial for aid agencies not to fall into the trap of benevolent patriarchy—that is, 
encouraging men to be nicer, rather than considering how gendered privileges and roles have 
impacted their lives. 
 
Potential Impact on Feminist Space and Gender Norms 
One of the key concerns for feminists when confronted with the instrumentalization of 
religion is the narrowing of scope for strategies and voices that fall outside of the religious 
paradigm (Kandiyoti 2011; Tadros 2011). By favouring one approach above others, it can 
also marginalise NGOs and activists who are non-religious based. For instance, during a 
conversation with a gender adviser who works for a bilateral agency in Kabul, I raised the 
question of donor support towards women NGOs’ safety, citing the case where a female 
NGO outreach worker was abducted and assaulted. The response from the gender adviser 
was: ‘X [name of women’s NGO], I know this sounds awful, but if they’re so radical, what 
can you expect to happen?’ (A3c Interview 2010). Similarly, the director of an international 
NGO maintains: ‘[e]ngaging with religious leaders is a must to build trust, if there is to be 
any trust in Afghanistan’ (A3b Interview 2010). It is undeniable that Islam is bound deeply in 
people’s daily lives and spiritual beliefs, but by presenting aid effectiveness as a matter of 
observing the local religious protocols, it not only simplifies the complexities of gender 
issues and violence against women in Afghanistan, but also forces local NGOs to take up a 
religious front that can diminish their feminist politics, and adversely impact service delivery: 
Informant: To appease the community and donors, we’ve had to pretend the 
[domestic violence] program is something to help women to become better 
housewives and mothers… 
Interviewer: Why do you have to say that? 
Informant: We have to maintain feminist politics in our service delivery, but donors 
don’t understand that…It’s hard enough to monitor staff, and make sure they don’t 
impose their own values upon women, like asking them what have they done to 
deserve the beating (A2b Interview 2010). 
For projects such as ‘Happy Family, Healthy Community’ there is also the challenge of 
monitoring and evaluating behavioural change. While the project has a good accountability 





government representatives to all write separate reports after each information workshop in 
the local community), there is a potential challenge in assessing behavioural changes for local 
male participants. As the project comes from the angle that ‘the only things that can solve the 
problems of family and community are the orders and commands of Islam’ (UNFPA et al., 
date unknown, i), it would be difficult for project participants (or their wives and families 
where private, triangulate interviews16 were conducted) to discuss resistance to behavioural 
change, as it would suggest being ‘un-Islamic’ despite weeks or months of workshops on 
Islam and gender. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that the complexity and challenges faced by civil society 
organisations working to end violence against women in occupied Afghanistan cannot be 
solved by a focus on religion alone. As a social movement, religion can be as much a divisive 
force as a uniting one, thus international aid agencies and academics should not overlook the 
implications of instrumentalizing faith-based movements in the name of gender equality. The 
dialogue between conservative and progressive religious quarters in Afghanistan is highly 
relevant, and the need to engage with religious leaders and scholars for their expertise and 
support is indisputable. However, these processes are situated within the following: a larger 
framework of donor politics that at times constrain and frustrate local partners’ efforts; a 
political environment at the national and local level that has been historically unfriendly to 
women; a changing political economy that in turn affects local cultures and traditions; and a 
fragile peace-building process in which the space for women to articulate their rights and 
concerns is diminishing. 
Furthermore, within the politically sensitive climate of military occupation and security risks, 
while both civil society organisations and the foreign military forces attempt to localise their 
projects within Afghanistan’s cultural and social framework for different reasons, civil 
society should use this opportunity to question their motives for doing so, and whether there 
is a genuine effort to engage with local communities and cultures. As Sholkamy (2011, 53) 
observed: ‘It would be illusionary to assume that religious authority is “pure” or un-mediated 
by power.’ In the Afghanistan case study which I have presented, the ‘power’ in question is 
an uneasy mix of gendered politics, military occupation, and international aid. 
 
Civil society would do well to examine its own motives and rationales for using a religious 
framework. While some would argue that local communities accept gender projects that are 
based on Islam and instructed by local religious authorities, the question we should ask is 
whether acceptance was based on an understanding of why gender is important, or was it for 













local leaders and aid agencies. If this is so, then the occupation of Afghanistan will be two-
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